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ANTI-ESSENTIALISM, RELATIVISM, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

TRACY E. HIGGINS*

Feminism is the fire that melts, but does not destroy.
-Dr. Nahid Toubia'

INTRODUCTION
2
During the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women,
cultural differences among women presented a series of practical and
theoretical problems. The practical problems arose out of the enormous
task of negotiating among a large group of people a single, albeit complex, document that would set an agenda for addressing the problems of
women globally.3 Differences in culture, language, religion, and education presented complications at every stage of the process. As a theoretical matter, such differences presented a less immediate but in some ways
more difficult and persistent problem: In the face of profound cultural
differences among women, how can feminists maintain a global political
4
movement yet avoid charges of cultural imperialism?

* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1990; A.B., Princeton, 1986. I would like to thank Katherine Franke, Sally Goldfarb,
Linda McClain, Martha McCluskey, and Carlin Meyer for helpful comments on an early
draft of this Article. My thinking on this topic was clarified by discussions with Matthew
Diller, Martin Flaherty, Abner Greene, Jim Kainen, Frank Michelman, Russ Pearce, Paul
Schwartz, Lloyd Weinreb, and Ben Zipursky. As always, Peter Yu provided insightful
comments and editorial suggestions. I thank Robye Shaw, Alyssa Mendelson, and David
Amendola for their research assistance. The research for this Article was supported by
a grant from Fordharn University School of Law. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the Mediterranean Institute of International Affairs in Malta, 1993. I thank
the participants at that conference for their insights and engagement with this topic.
INahid Toubia, Foreword to WOMEN OF THE ARAB WORLD: THE COMING CHALLENGE
at xii (Nahid Toubia ed. & Nahed El Gamal trans., 1988).
2The United Nations-sponsored conference was held in Beijing in September 1995.
An affiliated gathering of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was held in Huairou,
a suburb approximately 30 miles from the official conference site in Beijing.
3 The media widely documented these complexities, especially as they played out in
Beijing. In addition to the inevitable practical problems facing a global conference, the
participants were frustrated by the interference of the Chinese government, particularly
at the affiliated meeting of NGOs. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Meddling by China is Seen
as Marring Meeting on Women, N.Y. TnaEs, Sept. 2, 1995, at Al; Seth Faison, Chinese
Jostle Thousands of Women at Forum, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at All.
4Although the Beijing document ultimately reaffirmed the universality of human
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This theoretical dilemma has become a serious political hurdle for
global feminism as the challenge of cultural relativism 5 permeates the
politics of any discussion of women's rights on the international stage.
For example, at the 1994 United Nations Population Conference in
Cairo, the Vatican joined with several Muslim governments to condemn
what they viewed as the imposition of Western norms of sexual license
and individual autonomy on the rest of the world. 6 Although most advocates of reproductive control at the Population Conference did not attempt to translate policy claims into the language of international human
rights, 7 the issue of cultural relativism was central to the debate over
differing visions of the family and the role of women.8 For example,
although she acknowledged that substantial problems of overpopulation
plague many Muslim countries including Pakistan, Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto joined with the Vatican in criticizing what she perceived as
Western efforts to impose norms of radical individualism on the rest of
the world. 9 In Beijing, a variety of groups once again levied this charge
of imperialism against Western feminists expanding it beyond issues of
sexuality and reproduction to include women's roles within the family
and in public life.' 0

rights, debate over a footnote that would have recognized cultural differences remained
a point of disagreement late into the drafting process. Moreover, a number of nations
entered reservations, many of which were based on cultural differences. See Seth Faison,
Women Carry Hopes as Conference Ends, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 16, 1995, at A5.
5 1 use the term cultural relativism to mean a commitment to one or both of the
following positions: that transcendent standards for evaluating cultures are unavailable
and/or that all cultures are equally valid. See discussion infra text accompanying notes
31-33.
6See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Vatican Drops Fight Against U.N. PopulationDocument,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1994, at A5; Dick Kirschsten, A Page Was Turned in Cairo, 26
NAT'L J. 2178 (1994); Alan Cowell, U.N. Population Meeting Adopts Program of
Actions, N.Y. "IMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A2.
7Vice-President Gore characterized the issue of abortion as a matter of national
sovereignty, not a human right to which women are entitled. See Alan Cowell, Vatican
Says Gore Is Misrepresenting Population Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
3Several Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Sudan, boycotted the talks
altogether while others attended but voiced objections to the proposed document. See
Alan Cowell, Vatican Rejects Compromise on Abortion at U.N. Meeting, N.Y. TwMEs,
Sept. 7, 1994, at Al, A8 (quoting an Islamic newspaper describing the conference as
"hailing promiscuity, calling for abortion and extramarital sex, and pointing to an era
with no morals, where all values are trampled underfoot").
9 Cf. Doug Struck, U.S. Tries to Defuse Abortion Issue, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 6, 1994,
at 1A, 7A (quoting Prime Minister Bhutto, "Kill not your children on a plea of want.
Islam, except in exceptional circumstances, rejects abortion as a method of population
planning:'). "
10Interestingly, conservative groups within the United States and the Vatican seemed
to assert the charge of imperialism most strenuously. Non-Western women's groups more
often framed their objections as a challenge to the relevance of the Western women's
agenda than complaints of coercion. See Barbara Crossette, The Second Sex in the Third
World, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1995, at A25.
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Feminist responses to this charge are complicated and sometimes
conflicting. On the one hand, feminists note that culture and religion are
often cited as justifications for denying women a range of basic rights,
including the right to travel, rights in marriage and divorce, the right to
own property, even the right to be protected by the criminal law on an
equal basis with men.'1 Women have much to lose, therefore, in any
movement away from a universal standard of human rights in favor of
deference to culture. On the other hand, feminists acknowledge that
feminism itself is grounded in the importance of participation, of listening to and accounting for the particular experiences of women, especially those on the margins of power.' 2 Indeed, much feminist criticism
of traditional human rights approaches has focused on the tendency of
international policymakers to exclude women's experiences and women's
voices.' 3 Thus, the claim that Western concepts of women's equality are
exclusionary or imperialist strikes at the heart of one of feminism's
central commitments-respect for difference.
In short, both the move to expand universal human rights to include
those rights central to women's condition and the move toward a relativist view of human rights are consistent with and informed by feminist
theory. Indeed, the tension between them reflects a tension within feminism itself, between describing women's experience collectively as a
basis for political action and respecting differences among women. Addressing this tension, this Article endeavors to sort out the degree to
which feminism, by virtue of its own commitments, must take cultural
defenses seriously, particularly when articulated by women themselves.
Part I reviews the challenge cultural relativism presents to universalist
theories of human rights generally and to global feminism in particular.
Part II argues that feminist anti-essentialism 14 has raised objections to
general theories of women's oppression similar to those raised by cultural relativism and suggests that feminist anti-essentialism and cultural
I See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795 (1992) (discussing
general reservations grounded upon personal status laws that states have entered to the
Women's
Convention).
12 See infra part II.B. (discussing anti-essentialism and respect for difference).
3

1 WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW INTEREST GROUP, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-170

(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibilityfor Violations
of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 125 (1994); Celina Romany, Women
as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/PrivateDistinctionin InternationalHuman
Rights Law, 6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN
(Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).

141 use the term anti-essentialism to refer to the rejection by many feminists of the
idea that particular characteristics can be identified with women over time and across
cultures. Feminist anti-essentialists tend to emphasize differences among women as well
as differences between men and women. See discussion infra part II.

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

relativism share a critical stance toward universal accounts of women's
condition. By emphasizing the overlap of anti-essentialism and cultural
relativism, Part II raises the question of the degree to which relativist
defenses of culture threaten global feminism. Part III attempts to answer
this question by analyzing the logic of cultural relativism and feminist
anti-essentialism and distinguishing them according to their different
normative commitments. Finally, Part IV elaborates a vision of international feminist theory as poised between universalism and cultural relativism and explores the implications of this position for constructive
cross-cultural evaluation.
I. CULTURAL RELATIVISM VS. UNIVERSALISM
The debate over the universality of human rights is almost as old as
the movement toward universal human rights standards in international
law. Following World War II, as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was being drafted, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) warned that the Declaration would be "a
statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in
the countries of Western Europe and America." 15 The Board added that
"standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive"
and thus "what is held to be a human right in one society may be
regarded as anti-social by another people."'1 6 A global audience found
this position of moral relativism particularly troubling in the wake of the
Nazi Holocaust and feared that it would wholly undermine the nascent
human rights agenda.' 7 Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of the AAA
and the emergence of conflicts of values among participating nations, 18
the Declaration embraced the assumption of the universality of human
19
rights.
15

American Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHRO-

POLOGIST
539 (1947).
'61d.
17See J. Roland Pennock, Rights, NaturalRights, and Human Rights-A General View,

23 NoMos 1, 5 (1981) (discussing how a renewed commitment to human rights emerged
in response to the totalitarian abuses of the second quarter of the 20th century).
18 For example, Arab states challenged the right to change religion, a standard contrary
to the tenets of Islam. See HowARD TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1, 22 (1987). The Soviets were opposed to the preponderance of Western civil liberties.
Id. at 21. Western nations were persuaded to include economic, social, and cultural rights
in the document only after having been persuaded that it would not be legally binding.
Id. at 21-22.
19
The Declaration states:
The General Assembly [p]roclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end
that every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive
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Despite the general consensus reflected in the Declaration, differences
have persisted over the scope and priorities of the international human
rights agenda, differences that are translated with surprising frequency
into the rhetoric of universality versus cultural relativism, imperialism
versus self-determination. 20 Notwithstanding the language of universality, the question remains: To what extent may a state depart from international norms in the name of culture? Both the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights contribute to this tension in their recognition of the importance
of the collective right to self-determination. 21 These documents do not
clearly resolve the degree to which citizens, exercising their right of
self-determination, may subordinate other protected rights in the interest
22
of security, development, or culture.
Apart from any ambiguities in human rights instruments themselves,
non-Western states have argued that the very hierarchy of human
rights established in those instruments privileges civil and political
rights over economic, social and cultural rights in a way that is biased
toward both Western political traditions and the wealth of Western states
relative to the rest of the world.23 Strategic enforcement of existing
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
G.A. Res. 217(A)(II), U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948).
20
It is not self-evident why the debate should take place on the more general level of
the status of rights and their universal application rather than over the substance and
interpretation of the rights themselves. It may be that casting the debate on this general
level allows opponents of an international human rights agenda to convert their argument
from "anti-rights" to "pro-culture" in much the way pro-life and pro-choice advocates
have struggled over language and labels. Whatever the reason, the universality/relativism
debate has permeated human rights discourse from the academy to the press to local
politics.
21Both Covenants include as Part I, Article I, Section (1) the following language:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (emphasis
added); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (emphasis added).
22David P. Forsythe, Socioeconomic Human Rights: The United Nations, the United
States, and Beyond, 4 Hum. RTS. Q. 433, 434-35 (1982).
23The circumstances under which that document was drafted support the perception
that early human rights documents, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, reflect a Western bias. The membership of the drafting committee, the Commission on Human Rights, was overwhelmingly Western. In addition, the U.S. Department
of State orchestrated the early drafting of a proposed constitution. See TOLLEY, supra
note 18, at 3. Finally, most of the critical meetings took place in the United States, and
American NGOs were extremely influential in the process. See John P. Humphrey, The
Universal Declarationof Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character,in
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standards, 24 coupled with the persistence of discrimination and economic
inequality in Western nations, have further called into question the adequacy of Western concepts of civil and political rights to ensure human
well-being. Finally, postmodernism and identity politics within the academy have contributed to the critique of universalism by questioning its
very philosophical foundations. 5
Located within this political and intellectual milieu, contemporary
26
defenses of universalism range from natural rights arguments to posi29
28
27
tivism to utilitarianism to social contract theories. Regardless of
21 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
Despite the dominance of the U.S. in the drafting process, the degree to which the
document reflects Western rather than universal norms is contested. According to some,
the notion that the standards embodied in the document are uniquely Western is itself
profoundly racist. See RICHARD SCHIFTER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Human Rights: A
CulturalBias?, in CURRENT POLICY No. 1105, 2-3 (1988).
Western
24
See, e.g., Richard Falk, Intervention Revisited: Hard Choices and Tragic Dilemmas,
NATION, Dec. 20, 1993, at 755 (identifying and criticizing political motives underlying
the United States' "humanitarian" intervention in Kuwait, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti);
Robert S. Greenburger, Restraint of Trade: Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message
From U.S. to China, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1994, at Al (discussing the controversy in
U.S. human rights and business communities over the extension of "most-favored-nation"
trade status to China). But see Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The
JurisprudenceWar, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 122 (1991) (arguing that military intervention is almost always motivated by political and humanitarian concerns and is therefore
subject to multiple interpretations).
25See Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner, Introduction to POSTMODERNISM AND
SOCIAL THEORY (Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner eds., 1992). Seidman and Wagner
explain:
HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION

Central to postmodernism is its critique of the claim that scientific knowledge is
universal and can be justified in a noncontextual way. Postmodernists contend that
standards of truth are context-dependent .... Postmodernists tend to favor forms
of social inquiry which incorporate an explicitly practical and moral intent, that
are contextual and restricted in their focus (local stories are preferred over general
ones), and that are narratively structured rather than articulating a general theory.
Id.26at 6-7.
See, e.g., Hedley Bull, The Universality of Human Rights, 8 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L
STUD. 155, 159 (1980) ("The validity of our beliefs about human rights does not depend
on the amount of consensus that exists in favor of them . . . ."); Josef L. Kunz,
Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of InternationalLaw, 55 Am. J. INT'L L.
951, 958 (1961) (viewing natural law not as "a system of legal norms, but a system of
highest legal principles").
27 See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 49-50 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 1963); Rudolf Bystricky, The
Universality of Human Rights in a World of Conflicting Ideologies, in INTERNATIONAL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds., 1968).
PROTECTION
21
See, e.g., RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979)
(offering utilitarian analysis of human rights); Richard M. Hare, Justice and Equality, in

116, 130 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds.,
1978) (defining the critical question as "[w~hat principles of justice, what attitudes
towards the distribution of goods, what ascriptions of rights, are such that their acceptance
is in the general interest?").
29The most widely known of modern social contract theorists is, of course, John

JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
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which form the arguments ultimately take, assertions of the universal
nature of such claims tend to rest upon an epistemological assumption
about the universality of human reason rather than a metaphysical
claim about their correspondence with a reality independent of human
understanding.30 Under such immanent universalist theories, truth is a
product of the right functioning of human reasoning. This claim about
human knowing, in turn, has the consequence of privileging the thinker,
the philosopher, the scientist, or the lawyer in the debate over the meaning
of human experience. The truth claims that emerge are normative and
are understood as substantially independent of history, individual
choices, and human experience. Disagreements over human rights are
errors in reason, logical mistakes which can be resolved through better

thinking.
Opposing the various theories offered as justifications for the exist-

ence of universal human rights, cultural relativism reflects skepticism
about the availability of universal norms. 31 Like universalism, cultural
relativism takes a number of different forms .3 Generally speaking, however, cultural relativists are committed to one or both of the following
premises: that knowledge and truth are culturally contingent, creating a
barrier to cross-cultural understanding; and that all cultures are equally

valid. 33 Combined with the empirical observation of cultural diversity

worldwide, these two premises lead to the conclusion that human rights
norms do not transcend cultural location and cannot be readily translated
Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993); see also John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993)
(applying constructivist view of justice as fairness to derive universally applicable human
rights
principles).
30
Richard Rorty describes this movement away from metaphysical realism as reflecting
the waning relevance of moral philosophy to the human condition:
Why has knowledge become much less important to our self-image than it was
two hundred years ago? Why does the attempt to found culture on nature, and
moral obligation on knowledge of transcultural universals, seem so much less
important to us than it seemed in the Enlightenment? Why is there so little
resonance, and so little point, in asking whether human beings in fact have the
rights listed in the Helsinki Declaration? Why, in short, has moral philosophy
become such an inconspicuous part of our culture?
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 29, at 111, 120.
31
Rorty describes cultural relativism very simply as "den[ying] the existence of
morally
relevant transcultural facts.' Id. at 116.
32
See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
109-10 (1989) (distinguishing among three different types of cultural relativism based
on3 3each one's assumption about the degree to which culture dictates moral norms).
See generally RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934); Fernando R. Teson,
International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 870-71
(1985); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of
Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 303 (1982).

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

across cultures. 34 The two premises of cultural relativism deprive human
rights advocates of both a transcendent justification for human rights
standards (i.e., notwithstanding disagreement, human rights exist as a
product of the human condition) and a hope for consensus (by bridging
the barriers of cultural difference). Cultural relativism raises the possibility that the category "human" is no longer sufficient to enable crosscultural assessment of human practices or the actions of states.
Although this debate over the philosophical foundations of human
rights raises interesting theoretical questions, one must acknowledge that
encroachments on human freedom are not generally the result of metaphysical errors. 35 Indeed, one can fairly accuse academics of overstating
the risks posed by such metaphysical errors. For example, universalists
who reject the significance of culture often reinforce their argument by
citing the threat of nihilism or radical moral relativism. 36 Such arguments
have led anthropologist Clifford Geertz to observe, "There may be some
genuine nihilists out there.., but I doubt very many have become such
'37
as a result of an excessive sensitivity to the claims of other cultures.
On the other hand, relativists who privilege cultural difference may
overstate the threat of imperialism posed by human rights advocacy,
deferring to cultural practices that seem clearly oppressive. 8 Caught
34

Early influential relativist works include Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man,
14 J. AM. FOLKLORE 11 (1901) (suggesting that there may be other civilizations, "based
perhaps on different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and reason,
which are of no less value than ours"); BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 278 (arguing for
tolerance of "the coexisting and equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created
for itself from the raw materials of existence"); and MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND
His WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 63 (1964) (arguing that
"[e]valuations are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise"). See also
ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) (advocating relativism to the extent that it supports tolerance for other

cultures, but condemning coercive practices); DAVID B. WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY
(1984) (attempting to reconcile a commitment to cultural relativism with the exercise of
objective
moral judgment).
35
As my colleague Ben Zipursky points out, rejecting (or embracing) Kant is not likely
to solve many of the world's problems.
36Some have worried about the implications of relativism for progressive politics. See,
e.g., Susan M. Okin, Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences, 22 POL. THEORY 5
(1994) (asking, "Doesn't stressing differences, especially cultural differences, lead to a
slide toward relativism?"). Others have embraced the relativist stance. See, e.g., STANLEY
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) (rejecting the availability of substantive norms and emphasizing the role of power in imposing a criterion of truth).
37Clifford Geertz, DistinguishedLecture: Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
263, 265 (1984).
3
8Martha Nussbaum cites several examples that, in her view, illustrate the degree to
which radical relativism has undermined a progressive human rights agenda. She
describes a conference in which scholars praised the integration of home and workplace
reflected in the existence of a menstruation taboo in both spheres and lamented that the
introduction of the smallpox vaccine destroyed the cult of Sittala Devi, the goddess to
whom one might pray to avoid the disease. See Martha Nussbaum, Human Functioning
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between the poles of nihilism and imperialism, human rights activists
are forced to choose between the rhetoric of cultural sensitivity and
claims of universal truth. Thus, the importance of the universalist/relativist debate for feminist human rights activists lies less in the philosophical debate itself than in the way that debate has influenced the
politics of human rights advocacy.
The influence of the universalist/relativist divide on the politics of
human rights is perhaps nowhere more evident than in debates over
women's rights as human rights. Cultural relativists have targeted feminism itself as a product of Western ideology and global feminism as a
form of Western imperialism. 39 Ironically, cultural relativists have accused feminist human rights activists of imposing Western standards on
non-Western cultures in much the same way that feminists have criticized states for imposing male-defined norms on women. The complexity of this debate has sown confusion among feminist human rights
activists, undermining the effectiveness of the global feminist movement.
In the remaining sections of this Paper, I attempt to clarify some of the
arguments, dispel some of the confusion, and turn to feminist theory
itself for a way out of the universalist/relativist dilemma.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINIST ANTI-ESSENTIALISM
Feminist concerns with difference and exclusion have created some of
the same dilemmas within feminism that cultural relativism has generated in the realm of international human rights. Indeed, debates within
feminism concerning the degree to which women's condition transcends
boundaries of culture, race, and class parallel the struggle between universal and culturally specific visions of human rights. Not surprisingly,
therefore, feminist theorizing on the global level is often divided between relativist and universalist approaches. 40 This section explores the
and Social Justice: In Defense ofAristotelian Essentialism,20 POL. THEORY 202, 203-05
(1992). She notes, "Under the banner of their radical and politically correct 'anti-essentialism' march ancient religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered husband, ill health,
and death." Id. at 204.
ignorance,
39
See, e.g., Micaela di Leonardo, Introduction: Gender, Culture, and Political Economy: Feminist Anthropology in HistoricalPerspective, in GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS
OF KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE POSTMODERN ERA 1, 10 (Micaela di

Leonardo ed., 1991) (asking, "[How could we analyze critically instances of male
domination and oppression in precisely those societies whose customs anthropology was
traditionally pledged to advocate?").
40 Some feminists have acknowledged the importance of differences among women and
yet, when advocating changes to human rights approaches, have tended to treat the
category of women as monolithic. See, e.g., Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human
Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 11 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Hilary
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assumptions that feminist theory shares with both universalism and cultural relativism. It first describes the emergence of feminist anti-essentialism as a challenge to the universal scope of feminist politics and the
persistence of essentialist theories of women's oppression in the face of
this challenge. It then discusses the implications of anti-essentialism for
feminist human rights activism.
A. Global Feminist Politics and the Appeal of Essentialism
Feminism has long been concerned with questions of difference. Initially, this concern focused almost exclusively on gender difference:
how women may differ from men;41 how to account for those differences; 42 whether and how those differences do (or should) matter in
private life and public policy.43 Although feminist theory continues to
develop around these issues of gender difference, 44 the question of difference has multiplied.
Much incisive and insightful criticism, particularly by feminists of
color, has revealed that treating gender difference as the primary concern
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613
(1991).
Others have focused more directly on differences among women. See, e.g., Isabelle R.
Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case
of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 189 (1992); Nancy Kim,
Toward A Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western
Imperialism and UncriticalAbsohtism 25 COLuM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 49 (1993).
41Perhaps the most oft-cited example of this type of analysis is the work of Carol
Gilligan, a psychologist who discerned different forms of moral reasoning among boys
and girls through her study of adolescent development. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A

(1982).
Feminists and others have paid much attention to the sources of observed gender
differences. This attention has had the effect of politicizing the line between biology and
culture as sources of gender difference. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for
Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1992) (arguing that the role of natural gender difference
in sex segregation in the labor market should be acknowledged); Kathryn Abrams, Social
Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor
Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021 (1992) (disagreeing with Epstein and arguing that
gender
differences are complex and based on multiple social and biological factors).
43
A specific example of this focus on gender difference is the equal treatment/different
treatment debate within feminist legal theory. Compare Wendy W. Williams, Equality's
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985) (advocating that employers treat pregnancy-related
conditions and other temporary disabilities equally) with Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (advocating that employers treat
pregnancy according to a standard that promotes women's equality).
44 One peculiar example of this focus is the attention paid during the weeks preceding
the Beijing Conference to the definition of "gender" in the document. Some suggested
that it be defined as biological maleness and femaleness; others advocated a cultural
definition of masculinity and femininity; still others suggested that use of the term
reflected a lesbian agenda. See Stanley Meisler, Women's Conference Bogs Down in
Semantics, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A25 (quoting Gary Bauer of the conservative
Family Research Council'as explaining that the concept of gender "has been used in
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
42
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of feminism has had the effect of reinforcing gendered categories and
collapsing differences among women.4 5 These critics have argued convincingly that early feminist descriptions of women's experience focused
on white, middle-class, educated, heterosexual women. Consequently,
the political priorities of the women's movement in the West (e.g., equal
access to education and employment, abortion rights) have reflected the
most urgent concerns of a relatively more powerful group of women.
Moreover, even shared concerns, such as domestic violence and rape,
have often been described and addressed based on the experiences of a
relatively narrow group of women. 46 Accused of essentialism, 47 feminists
who theorized a commonality among women were criticized for committing the dual sin of reinforcing patriarchal assumptions about women
as a group and marginalizing some women along the lines of race, class,
48
and sexual orientation.
Despite its theoretical and political vulnerabilities, the practical appeal
of essentialism, like the appeal of universalism, persists. Essentialist
assumptions offer the promise of uniting women in a way that transcends
or precedes politics. 49 Ellen Rooney has suggested that essentialism
reflects a "desire that what unites us (as feminists) pre-exist[s] our desire
to be joined; something that stands outside our own alliances may authorize
50
them and empower us to speak not just as feminists but as women.
feminist literature to mean that gender is .subject to change and that there exists a
of genders, perhaps even five").
spectrum
45
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, FeministJurisprudence:Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline,
Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989); Martha
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988);
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST

THOUGHT
(1988).
46
For example, Angela Harris has argued that black and white women's experiences
of rape have been qualitatively different, "an experience as deeply rooted in color as in

gender" Harris, supra note 45, at 598.
47Diana Fuss defines essentialism as "a belief in the real, true essence of things, the
invariable and fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity." DIANA
Fuss,

ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE at

48See SPELMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
49 Elizabeth Spelman explains this tendency in the following way:

xi (1989).

[A]s feminists, our motivation for thinking, talking, and writing about any
particular woman is that she is a woman; at the same time, the point is not to talk
only about one woman, but about women-any and all women. So the logic of
our inquiry and concern seems to lead us to focus on the "womanness" or
womanhood of any or all women, just as the Platonist's interest directs his
explorations ....

Id.
50
Ellen Rooney, Interview with Gayatri C. Spivak, In a Word. Interview, in THE
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 151, 152 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed eds., 1994). Ellen
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This desire may be felt even more urgently on the international level
where differences among women threaten to outweigh commonalities.
Much feminist activism on the international level has been premised
on two assumptions, both of which may be characterized as essentialist:
first, that women share types of experiences and are oppressed in particular ways as women; and second, that these experiences are often
different than those of men.5 1 These assumptions have led feminists to
challenge the traditionally narrow definition of human rights and attempt
to expand it to cover experiences shared by women as a group.5 2 Like
universalist descriptions of human rights or human well-being, feminist
essentialism has lent political coherence to the feminist movement and
has provided a foundation for Western feminists' expansion of their
political vision. Indeed, feminist progress in reshaping the scope of the
international human rights agenda stands as an important example of the
power of organizing around assumptions of commonality.
Perhaps feminism's most significant contribution in this context has
been to expand the scope of human rights to include not just what
nations do to one another or what nations do to their citizens, but what
citizens do to one another.5 3 Although some violations of women's rights
fit easily into a civil liberties analysis, much of the abuse of women is
part of a larger cultural and economic framework that renders women
systematically vulnerable to private power.54 Abuses of women's rights
that are not attributable to state action narrowly defined fall outside a
definition of human rights violations as solely a matter of state infringement of civil and political liberties. In contrast, the insistence at the
United Nations Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and again at the
Women's Conference in Beijing on the inclusion of violence against
women as a human rights issue has roots in the insight that countries

Rooney explains essentialism as "a dream of the end of politics among women, of a
formal
resolution to the discontinuity between women and feminisms." Id.
51
Feminists' explanation of the mechanism of this oppression varies from a focus on
a gendered division of labor, see, e.g., WOMAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY (Michelle Z.
Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974), to women's role in reproduction and the social
meaning of mothering, see, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 41; NANCY CHODOROW, THE
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER

(1978), to women's vulnerability to sexual violerice, see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
52
See Charlesworth et al., supra note 40 (applying many of the arguments and analyses
developed
by American feminists to international human rights).
5
3See Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of

Human
Rights, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 486 (1990); Charlesworth et al., supra note 40.
54
See, e.g., Bunch, supra note 40, at 13-14 (arguing that states must be held
accountable for sustaining conditions that enhance women's vulnerability to private
violence); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 83 (discussing sexual violence as a weapon of war, particularly
in the context of Bosnia).
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create and sustain the conditions under which women are victimized and
therefore should be accountable for the level of gender-based violence. 55
Feminists have therefore criticized the traditional focus on political
rights, or negative rights against the state, in international human rights
instruments as reflecting the view that the greatest threat to the life and
liberty of a citizen is the state. According to many feminists, that view
does not reflect the realities of women's lives.5 6 Rather, the private
exercise of male power, often reinforced by the state, more often threatens women's lives and liberty.5 7 Thus, by focusing on women's common
experience of private oppression, feminist work in international human
rights has revealed a potential inconsistency between a vision of human
rights as limiting state power and the need for state intervention to limit
abuses of private power. In this sense, feminism has offered an external
challenge to the adequacy of traditional human rights analysis.

B. Anti-essentialism, Cultural Relativism, and Feminist Human Rights
Activism
Although feminists have criticized the adequacy of traditional human
rights, they have less frequently attacked the universality of those rights.
Rather, recognizing the threat that cultural defenses pose to women's
rights, as defined from a Western feminist perspective, feminists have
most often argued for an expansion of both the scope and the applicability of human rights standards.58 Indeed, feminist efforts to expand the
55

This initiative on the international level parallels U.S. feminists' challenge to the
public/private dichotomy emphasizing the importance of state intervention to regulate
violence in the private sphere of the family. Compare CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMNIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (arguing that defining rights in terms

of restrictions on the state may disable the state from intervening to reallocate private
power in the family) with Bunch, supra note 40, at 13-14 (making a similar argument
with respect to states' human rights obligations).
56 For feminist critique of the public/private distinction in international law, see sources
cited supra note 13. See also Charlesworth et al., supranote 40, at 625-40; Bunch, supra
note 40, at 13-14. But see Fernando R. Teson, Feminism and InternationalLaw: A Reply,
33 VA. J. INT'L L. 647 (1993).
57 This is not to suggest that women are not also the victims of traditional human rights
violations-they are. Women are imprisoned, tortured, raped, killed, and silenced by state
authorities in the same way men are. Yet, women are more commonly imprisoned,
tortured, raped, killed, and silenced by their own spouses, lovers, and families. See
MAcKINNON, supra note 55.
58For example, Georgina Ashworth argues:
The cry against "interference in culture" is used as a defense of men's rights, not
of women's; it is used to avoid creating a "national shame" over the behaviour of
one sex toward the other, at the expense of the second sex.
Annie Bunting, Theorizing Women's CulturalDiversity in FeministInternationalHuman
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scope of human rights violations to include harms women suffer as a
result of cultural norms or religious practices pose an even greater threat
to cultural integrity than do traditional human rights standards. This
increased scrutiny of the culture and its most central institutions, the
church and the family, have9 made advocates of a global feminism a
5
target of cultural relativists.
In addition to criticism from cultural relativists, this cross-cultural
approach to women's oppression has not been immune from criticism
within the feminist community.60 Such cross-cultural analysis depends
upon very broad assumptions about women's lives and experiences and
therefore raises important empirical questions regarding the extent to
which women's oppression is similarly constituted across cultures. It
also raises issues about the formulation of those empirical questions
themselves. An essentialist approach generally begins with the experiences of white, middle-class, educated, heterosexual women.6 ' Such an
approach tends to attribute commonly shared forms of oppression to
gender and specific forms of oppression to other sources such as race,
class, or sexual orientation. Consequently, an essentialist approach risks
becoming a least common denominator approach, allowing relatively
privileged women's experiences to define the feminist agenda. This tendency, in turn, creates division among women. In short, when feminists
aspire to account for women's oppression through claims of cross-cultural commonality, they construct the feminist subject through exclusions, narrowing her down to her essence. And, as Judith Butler has
return to haunt the 'integrity' and
observed, "those excluded domains
'unity' of the feminist 'we'. ' ' 62
Responding to this division, anti-essentialist feminists have attempted
to rethink both the various descriptions of gender oppression that have
been offered and the assumption that gender oppression can be described
meaningfully along a single axis. Instead, they have focused on local,
Rights Strategies, 20 J.L. & Soc'Y 6, 9 (1993) (quoting GEORGINA ASHWORTH, Or
VIOLENCE AND VIOLATION: WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1986)). See also Karen
Engle, InternationalHuman Rights and Feminism: When DiscoursesMeet, 13 MIcH. J.

INT'L
L. 517, 545 (1992).
59
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 40, at 61 (citing examples of relativist critique of
international feminist practice, including feminist critique of purdah and female genital
surgery).
60

See, e.g., Gunning, supra note 40; Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public Interna-

tional Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1509
(1992).
61This is not logically inevitable. An essentialist approach could begin from the
experiences of any subset of women and generalize those experiences. Nevertheless,

within Western feminist theory, essentialism has meant a generalization from the
experiences
of relatively privileged women.
62

Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism", in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 3, 14 (Judith Butler & Joan NV.Scott
eds., 1992).
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contextualized problems of gender oppression. 63 In this sense, anti-essentialism's criticism of general accounts of women's oppression parallels cultural relativism's critique of universal theories of human rights.
Like cultural relativism, feminist anti-essentialism seems to lead to the
conclusion that gender inequality cannot be explained cross-culturally.
Thus, despite the general inclination of feminist human rights activists
to side with universalists, feminist theory, specifically anti-essentialism,
does resonate with relativists' concern over cultural imperialism. Indeed,
global feminists' tendency to take for granted the adequacy of their own
standards-reflected in their simultaneous insistence on both the inadequacy of traditional human rights norms and the universal application of
amended, feminist standards-is precisely the tendency that generated
64
the anti-essentialist critique within feminism itself.
Notwithstanding this resonance, some feminists have cautioned that
radical anti-essentialism, like cultural relativism, threatens to undermine
the central goal of feminist human rights advocacy: to identify and
criticize systems of inequality and injustice that transcend cultural, political, and geographic boundaries. 65 The assumption that gender is culturally contingent not only calls into question universalist notions of
gender justice but also renders problematic a feminist critique of legal
66
institutions and legal reform outside of narrow, localized experience.
To the extent that feminist anti-essentialism questions the use of crosscultural categories, it threatens to undermine the identification of broad
67
structures of inequality premised on gender.

63

See, e.g., Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.

1597 (1990) (examining and defending calls for contextual analysis); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 881 (1990) (advocating

"positionality" a stance that acknowledges that "the individual perspectives that yield
and judge truth are necessarily incomplete").
64As Karen Engle notes, when feminists "claim universal human rights in the face of
a world that does not universally agree, they are plagued by the counter-claim of cultural
relativism"
Engle, supra note 58, at 545.
65

Sabina Lovibond expresses the reaction of many feminists when she asks in response
to postmodern critique, "How can anyone ask me to say goodbye to 'emancipatory
metanarratives' when my own emancipation is such a patchy, hit-and-miss affair?" Sabina
Lovibond, Feminism and Postmodernism, 178 NEw LEFr REV.5, 12 (1989).
66It is precisely this disabling of broad social criticism that has led some feminists to
question the usefulness of postmodern theory for feminism. See Kathryn P. Addelson,
Knower/Doers and Their Moral Problems, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIEs 265 (Linda
Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993); Sandra Harding, Feminism, Science, and the
Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, in FEMINISM/POsTMODEP.NIsM 83 (Linda J. Nicholson ed.,

1990) (arguing against complete relinquishment of modernist notions of epistemology as
justificatory strategy); Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is
"Strong Objectivity?", in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES, supra, at 49; Lovibond, supra note

65.

67

See Nancy Fraser & Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy, in

FEMirNISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 66, at 1, 25 (1990); ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE
FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 18-19 (1988).
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It is perhaps this concern that has left feminist advocates on the
international level much more reluctant than feminists within the United
States to accept the implications of anti-essentialism. At least within a
single state, cultural commonalities and legal institutions provide a common framework within which difference can be contained. On the international level, the parameters of such a framework are much more
difficult to identify. Moreover, adherence to a universalist approach has
been relatively successful for feminist human rights advocates. Although
the effort to develop Western notions of justice has proceeded largely
without women's participation-and indeed at times with the assumption
that they are incapable of reason-women have made identifiable legal
gains on the international level by resorting to claims of justice and
equality. Feminists therefore fear that without an objectively defensible
basis for evaluating the status of women, women will be left with power
alone to dictate the outcome of competing claims of truth.68 That prospect most frightens those who are most oppressed.
A feminist approach to international human rights therefore leads in
two apparently conflicting directions at once: (1) increased awareness
universally of the importance of cultural and economic rights for women,
including such issues as the structure of the family; and (2) increased
respect for cultural difference based on an awareness of the partiality of
perspective, a skepticism of universal claims of authenticity. Is the tension irreconcilable? Does a feminist commitment to resist imperialism,
a commmitment born of women's own experience of powerlessness
under patriarchy, leave us without a standard by which to condemn
abuses of women throughout the world?
Increasingly aware of the diversity of women's experience, sympathizing with the claim that universalism may be barely disguised ethnocentrism, and embracing in large part a position of epistemological skepticism, feminists are faced with a dilemma. Should they move to expand
human rights to encompass women's experience as though it were monolithic or, recognizing women's differences, reject the universality of
human rights divorced from cultural context? The latter conclusion risks
undermining feminist critiques of cultural practices that are deeply
harmful to women. Women are economically disempowered in the name
of culture. They are denied the right to be educated, 69 to travel, 0 to seek
68See, e.g., Man J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1768 (1990) (warning that "[the emphasis on context
and provisional truth does not remove the obligation to divide right from wrong and to
retain
justice as the goal of theory").
69
See, e.g., THE WORLD'S WOMEN: 1995 TRENDS AND STATISTIcS 90 (United Nations
1995) (documenting a lower literacy rate for women than men in every region of the
world).
70For example, in Afghanistan, an Islamic fundamentalist group supported by Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia has restricted women to the home, permitting them to leave their homes
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paid employment, 7 1 to divorce. 7 2 They are denied legal protection against
domestic violence, including spousal murder.73 They are subject to painful, often dangerous surgery to ensure female chastity. 74 Together these
practices and countless others create and sustain cultures of male privilege across the globe. Feminists must therefore respond to relativist or
anti-essentialist arguments and take seriously issues of cultural difference without surrendering a critical stance toward the many forms of
women's oppression.

I][. UNPACKING THE LOGIC OF RELATIVISM
As the preceding section suggests, feminism reveals the existence of
multicultural patriarchy, yet feminist commitments seem to render untenable both the acceptance of cultural practices that harm women and
the unproblematic condemnation of such practices based on universalist
standards. For feminists, the challenge is simultaneously to reject universalist human rights claims that fail to account for difference and to
embrace a normative conception of gender justice that is critical of
patriarchy across cultures. This section explores whether these commitments are inconsistent. The first part considers whether feminist anti-essentialism's assumption of cultural contingency renders evaluation impossible, as some cultural relativist arguments suggest. The second part
explains the different conclusions reached by cultural relativists and
only if they are fully veiled and accompanied by a male family member. See John F
Bums, From Cold War, Afghans Inherit Brutal New Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at

Al,7 1 A8.

See, e.g., THE WORLD'S WOMEN, supra note 69, at 108-09 (documenting women's
disproportionate share of unpaid work and worldwide underrepresentation in the paid
labor
market).
72
See, e.g., Koki Muli, "Help Me Balance the Load": Gender Discrimination in
Kenya, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 40, at 78 (describing the inequality between the rights of men and women in
marriage and divorce in Kenya); Elizabeth H. White, Legal Reform as an Indicator of
Women's Status in Muslim Nations, in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 52, 56-57 (Lois
Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978) (noting that despite reforms in divorce law, in the
Muslim World, there is still a profound inequality in men and women's ability to secure
a divorce).
73See, e.g., Hina Jilani, Whose Laws?: Human Rights and Violence in Pakistan, in
FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 63, 66-73
(Margaret Schuler ed., 1992) (discussing legal barriers to combatting domestic violence
in Pakistan); CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL 18-39 (Women's
Rights Project of Human Rights Watch, 1991) (documenting spousal murder and available legal defenses in Brazil).
74
See, e.g., Asma Mohammed A'Haleem, Claiming Our Bodies and Our Rights,
Exploring Female Circumcision as an Act of Violence in Africa, in FREEDOM FROM
VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 73 (exploring
the practice of female genital surgeries in Africa, particularly in the Sudan).
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feminist anti-essentialists regarding the possibility of cross-cultural critique by analyzing their different normative commitments and assumptions about culture and coercion.
A. Contingency Does Not Entail Radical Relativism
The notion that the only coherent descriptions of knowledge or truth
are dependent on human cognition and rooted in human history has
informed both cultural relativism and feminist anti-essentialism. 75 Both
cultural relativists and feminist anti-essentialists must therefore consider
the degree to which this assumption of contingent knowledge undermines any basis for evaluation. Does a loss of faith in the existence of
(or at least our access to) standards external to human experience lead
to the conclusion that we can no longer credibly evaluate the actions of
others outside our cultural location? Feminist anti-essentialism and cultural relativism offer very different answers to this question.
The assumption that knowledge is contingent is often taken to entail
a retreat into extreme relativism. 76 Lacking, on the one hand, complete
consensus about moral norms, or on the other hand, unmediated access
to human nature, the relativist concludes that no legitimate basis for
evaluation exists. 77 Yet, this argument jumps too easily from the recog75

See Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 67, at 26 (noting that feminists "have criticized
modem foundationalist epistemologies and moral and political theories, exposing the
contingent, partial, and historically situated character of what has passed in the mainstream for necessary, universal, and ahistorical truths"); Geertz, supra note 37, at 263;
MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM

14 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973) (noting that the principles that we may use for

judging behavior "are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise"); Rorty,

supra note 30, at 116 (defining the claim that "nothing relevant to moral choice separates
human beings from animals except historically contingent facts of the world, cultural
facts"); Bartlett, supra note 63, at 829 (emphasizing the importance of contingent,
partial-knowledge
claims in feminist theory and politics).
76
Martha Nussbaum explains this reasoning as follows:
First an impossible demand is made, say, for unmediated presentness to reality as
it is in itself or for an actual universal agreement about matters of value. Next, it
is claimed that this demand cannot be met. Then, without further ado . . . the
theorist concludes that everything is up for grabs and there are no norms to give

us guidance in matters of evaluation.
Nussbaum, supra note 38.
77Anna Funder rejects this logic, explaining:
Westerners are used to thinking that for something to be true, it must be
universally applicable: the idea of culturally different value systems threatens the
truth of our values. This is an unnecessary logic: the issue is how and in whose

interests culture or rights work, not whether they are true.
Anna Funder, De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 417, 439 (1993).
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nition that moral norms are contingent to the assumption that concededly
contingent moral norms may not be applied cross-culturally. The apparent trap between universality and relativism is a remnant of the argument
that links the legitimacy of knowledge claims to the existence of verifiably
true or universally agreed upon neutral principles. 78 The relativist laments the demise of universalist certitude only if she believes it a
precondition of political action. 79 Unwilling to act without such certitude, she has not fully relinquished the hope for universal foundations
upon which to ground the exercise of power. It is this universalist hope
that undermines action in the face of uncertainty, not the recognition of
contingency itself. In contrast, detached from this universalist hope,
radical relativism leaves us with no pre-political basis to choose between
tolerance of other cultures and destruction of them.
In the context of human rights, recognition that a particular standard
is culturally contingent does not logically preclude its imposition crossculturally as a principle of international law or a standard of evaluation.
A state might formulate human rights standards and criticize the failure
of other states to meet those standards, notwithstanding the lack of any
philosophically or politically defensible universalist claim. With enough
political power, that state might even force the offending government to
cease the objectionable practice whether or not the enforced standard is
acknowledged as universal. Nevertheless, the description of the standard
as universal is significant in that it masks underlying normative judgments.80 The universalist may simply dismiss a culturally based defense
of violations of human rights norms as a failure of reason, evidence that
the offending state is insufficiently advanced in its development or recognition of human standards. For example, the universalist may characterize the proscription of child labor as a civilizing impulse rather than
the imposition of a culturally specific norm of childhood and family
labor. Thus, the claim of universality sets up a hierarchy of cultural
7

SFor an explanation of the link between relativism, nihilism, and objectivism, see

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-

TICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
79

Richard Rorty explains this point somewhat differently:

One reason [opponents of cultural relativism] reject it is that such relativism seems
to them incompatible with the fact that our human rights culture ... is morally
superior to other cultures. I quite agree that ours is morally superior, but I do not
think this superiority counts in favor of the existence of a universal human nature.
It would only do so if we assumed that a moral claim is ill-founded if not backed
up by knowledge of a distinctively human attribute.
Rorty, supra note 30, at 116.
80As Jane Flax explains, "speaking in knowledge's voice or on its behalf, we can avoid

taking responsibility for locating our contingent selves as the producers of knowledge
and truth claims." Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE
POLITICAL, supra note 62, at 458.
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practices, leaving the enforcing state secure in the knowledge that its
standards are transcendent.
Nevertheless, to relinquish the security of such universalist claims
does not necessarily entail the abandonment of human rights activism
and critique. Surrendering the assumption of a transcendent grounding
for evaluative judgments deprives the critic not of her capacity for
evaluation but of her confidence in the truth of her position. Judgments
can be made; they must simply be made contingently. By undermining
the hope for a source of knowledge that will guide political action
unambiguously in the service of freedom, a skepticism toward universalism deprives the critic, including the feminist critic, of any external
source of legitimacy. Without Nature or God or Reason as a basis for
judgment, the critic must rely on her own conception of justice as a basis
for action. Thus, the recognition of the cultural contingency of moral
standards neither releases the critic into a realm of irresponsible relativism nor mandates a position of conservative nonintervention. On the
contrary, it requires the critic to assume responsibility for the use of
power in the service of a particular normative vision. 81
Having assumed the contingency of moral norms, both feminist antiessentialists and cultural relativists must consider the legitimacy of imposing contingent norms cross-culturally. But this is a distinct inquiry.
A commitment to cultural contingency neither precludes feminism's crosscultural critique nor requires cultural relativism's agnosticism. Both positions are consistent with an underlying recognition of the contingency,
or relative status, of knowledge. The difference between feminism's,
even feminist anti-essentialism's, persistent critique of patriarchy across
cultures and cultural relativism's tolerance of cultural difference must
therefore arise from a difference in their normative assumptions. In order
to clarify the degree to which feminist and cultural relativist commitments are consistent, or, whether and to what extent feminists are vulnerable to relativists' critique, we must examine these assumptions.
Loss of faith in objectively valid universal norms leads to cultural
relativism only when coupled with a particular normative view that
81 Joan Williams has explained the advantage of abandoning universalist arguments as
follows:
A steadfast refusal to appeal in any context to objective moral certainties has, in
my view, more than epistemological significance. It offers us a chance to step back
and examine the structure of our form of life, to assess the hidden costs of our
ideals. How the ideal of universal brotherhood is inevitably hemmed in by the
arbitrary lines that people draw to define, and ultimately to limit, the scope of
their moral responsibility.
Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis.
L. REV. 131, 139.
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privileges cultural difference over cultural convergence. Such a view
takes two common forms: the defense of cultural diversity for its own
sake 82 and a commitment to pluralist values. 83 The anthropologist might
be inclined to the first view, lamenting the spread of Western culture or
even Western medicine to corrupt heretofore isolated communities. This
noninterventionist position reflects a clear normative commitment to
diversity, not a thoroughgoing skepticism about the legitimacy of such
judgments. After all, the emphasis on diversity as a good itself represents
84
a contested normative principle.
The preservation of cultural diversity as a justification for a noninterventionist stance toward other cultures does not appeal to most feminists.
Cultural relativism's normative commitment to difference conflicts with
feminism's normative commitment to ending gender oppression. Although feminists may be concerned with respecting the variety of ways
gender oppression is understood by women in different cultures, feminists are not inclined to value patriarchal cultures simply for their contribution to cultural diversity. 85 This commitment to cultural diversity for
its own sake, although frequently a political barrier to feminist objectives, does not present a serious internal challenge to feminist theorizing
about cultural difference or feminist critique of cultural practices.
The second common justification for agnosticism among cultural systems, a commitment to pluralist values, presents a more serious challenge to feminist universalist claims. Informed by liberalism or Western
commitments to pluralist values, 86 this position rejects a universal con82

This uncritical defense of culture is most commonly found in the anthropological
literature devoted to the study and preservation of culture. In an early and seminal work
in this area, Ruth Benedict argues that cultural norms, although sometimes coinciding,
are defensible only with reference to the culture itself. BENEDICT, supra note 33.
Addressing a controversial example, she explains, "The tabus on killing oneself or
another... though they relate to no absolute standard, are not therefore fortuitous ....
Taken up by a well-integrated culture, the most ill-assorted acts become characteristic
of its peculiar goals, often by the most unlikely metamorphoses." Id. at 46. Although
modem scholars rarely assume this tone of moral neutrality, many such works evince a
thoroughgoing reluctance to evaluate substantively the practices of other cultures. See
Nussbaum, supra note 38 (citing a number of examples); Craig Calhoun, Culture,
History, and the Problem of Specificity in Social Theory, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIAL
THEORY, supra note 25, at 244, 254 (discussing the problem of evaluation in the contest
between Western and Chinese medicine).
83 See infra text accompanying note 86.
84
Indeed, some have argued that anthropology's commitment to cultural relativism, to
the extent that it persists, derives from scholars' "hostility to the values of their own
society rather than from [theoretical imperatives]" Wilcomb E. Washburn, Cultural
Relativism, Human Rights, and the AAA, 89 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 939 (1987).
85 See di Leonardo, supra note 39, at 10 (expressing the difficulty for feminist analysis
presented by the anthropologist's noncritical stance); see also Marilyn Strathern, An
Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropology, 12 SIGNS 276, 286
(1987) (stating that "[f]rom the anthropological point of view" Western feminism tends
to 86"embod[y] ethnocentric commentary upon the world").
See, e.g., Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, and CulturalRelativism in France: The
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ception of human flourishing because the imposition of such a conception would deprive each individual of the opportunity to determine and
live by her own vision of the good. Under this view, cultural difference
must be respected because the imposition of moral norms across cultures
constitutes coercion, depriving individuals and communities of the ability to fashion their own standards. 87 Once again, this form of cultural
relativism does not necessarily follow from a position of radical relativism or skepticism toward moral universals., Rather, the emphasis it places
on individual freedom and cultural autonomy reflects a particular normative view of the prerequisites for human flourishing. 88
Nevertheless, for feminists, this principle of noncoercion coupled with
a relativist view of culture provides the most serious challenge to the
imposition of universal human rights standards. Unlike the argument
from simple diversity, this concern with coercion is closely related to
the politics of feminism. Having experienced the oppression resulting
from the imposition of male-defined norms within their own cultures,
Western feminists are reluctant to recreate that oppression cross-culturally. This concern is particularly acute when the arguably oppressive
practice-for example, veiling or female genital surgery-enjoys support among or is controlled by women within the culture.8 9
Case of Excision, 19 SIGNS 939, 952-54 (1994) (discussing the role of democratic theory
in promoting tolerance of cultural diversity in connection with the practice of female
circumcision in France).
S Refiecting a commitment to Western liberalism, existing human rights instruments
embody principles of both individual autonomy and collective self-determination. The
relativist-pluralist view takes the commitments further by rejecting any inherent or
universal limits on the scope of self-determination. For a discussion of feminist criticism
of both relativist and liberal pluralism, see infra part III.B. Although the principle of
self-governance is embodied in universalist human rights documents, it stands in some
tension with the majority of rights located in the individual. As articulated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of self-determination is limited by
the strongly liberal-individualist model that seems mandated by the catalogue of civil
and political rights. See Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations For the International
Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A
QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 48 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) (discussing the
relevance of culture to human rights and noting that "[e]xclusion from the rights-forming
process is itself a denial of human rights").
SSAnthropologists and other defenders of cultural relativism have recognized the
political implications of this noninterventionist stance. Attacking the concept of objectivity implicit in early defenses of relativism, defenders of cultural difference and
self-determination have increasingly formulated their arguments in terms of ending

oppression or, more specifically, colonialism. See, e.g.,

REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY

(Dell Hymes ed., 1972) (emphasizing the need for anthropology to do something for the
"oppressed" of mankind against their "oppressors").
s 9Feminist scholars have given considerable attention to the particular issue of female
genital surgery. See, e.g., Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on
International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 J.L. &
INEQUALITY 367 (1989); Engle, supra note 60; Funder, supra note 77; Gunning, supra
note 40; Winter, supra note 86. The practice of female genital surgery poses a particularly difficult practical and theoretical problem for feminists, in that it is at once
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Faced with differences across race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality,
Western feminists have struggled with the exclusionary consequences of
their own theories and political agenda. Expansion of this agenda crossculturally, however well meaning, seems fraught with the risk of coercion. At the same time, by emphasizing the risks of international feminism, cultural relativism or anti-essentialism may serve as a justification
for inaction or, worse, for accepting the vast inequalities in standards of
living between women (and men) in the West and women (and men) in
developing nations.

B. Two Views on Culture and Coercion
Although sharing a concern with cultural difference and a lack of faith
in the availability of universal standards, feminist anti-essentialism and
cultural relativism nevertheless reach different conclusions regarding the
possibility of cross-cultural evaluation. As the preceding section suggests, cultural relativists and feminist anti-essentialists are each concerned with the implications of cultural difference and the problem of
coercion, yet they view both culture and coercion differently. This section examines the concepts of coercion and culture as they are used in
both feminist anti-essentialist and cultural relativist arguments and suggests that, despite its commitment to tolerance, the relativist view of
culture tends to obscure issues of coercion at the heart of gender politics.
1. Cultural Relativism: Essentializing Culture, Obscuring Coercion
Feminists have questioned arguments based on a simple assertion of
cultural integrity for several reasons. First, cultural relativists may inadequately attend to the degree to which power relationships within the
culture itself constrain the ability of individuals to renegotiate cultural
norms. 90 Yet, this inattention is inconsistent with a concern about coercion. The relativist cannot criticize Western imperialism and at the same
physically dangerous, deeply threatening to Western norms of female sexuality, reflective
of patriarchal regulation of women's sexuality and, at the same time, performed by women

on women and girls.
90
Arif Dirlik notes:
A critical reading of culture, one that exposes it as an ideological operation crucial
to the establishment of hegemony, requires that we view it not merely as an
attribute of totalities but as an activity that is bound up with the operation of social
relations, that expresses contradiction as much as it does cohesion.
Arif Dirlik, Culturalism as Hegemonic Ideology and Liberating Practice, 6 CULTURAL
CRITIQUE: THE NATURE & CONTEXT OF MINORITY DISCOURSE 13, 15 (1987).
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time ignore non-Western states' selective use of the defense of culture
in the service of state power.91 The risk of such intra-cultural coercion
seems especially great when that selective invocation of culture has
differential effects on groups
within the state such as minority ethnic or
92
racial groups or women.
Second, cultural relativist arguments may oversimplify the complexity
and fluidity of culture by treating culture as monolithic and moral norms
within a particular culture as readily ascertainable. 93 Yet, a single, inward
glance at Western culture reveals the absurdity of this assumption. The
multiplicity of beliefs in the United States (or even within a single
community or family) about the legitimacy of abortion or the role of
women in the family illustrates the complexity of translating imperfectly
shared assumptions into evaluative standards. 94 Such oversimplification
seems inconsistent with the very premises of cultural relativism. Indeed,
cultural relativists' tendency to describe differences in terms of simple
opposition-Western versus non-Western-without exploring how specific cultural practices are constituted and justified "essentializes" culture itself.95 Treating culture as monolithic fails to respect relevant intra-cultural differences just as the assumption of the universality of
human rights standards fails to respect cross-cultural differences. Cultural differences that may be relevant to assessing human rights claims
are neither uniform nor static. Rather, they are constantly created, chal91
See, e.g., Ann E. Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women's Rights:
Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS:

INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECrIvEs, supra note 40, at 176 (citing examples of the

use of cultural or religious defenses by Islamic regimes accused of suppressing feminist
dissent). It is also worth noting that the Vatican has invoked the language of cultural
relativism, accusing the West of cultural imperialism, particularly in the realm of
women's rights and the role of women in the family. Cf. Vatican Denounces Europe as
Anti-Family,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at A1O.
92
See, e.g., Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human
Rights Discourse, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST

PERSPECTIVES, supra note 40, at 167, 169 ("No social group has suffered greater
violation of its human rights in the name of culture than women. Regardless of the
particular forms it takes in different societies, the concept of culture in the modem state
circumscribes
women's lives in deeply symbolic as well as immediately real ways.").
93
See id. at 172-73 (emphasizing the tendency to rely on so-called representative
cultural
practices without investigating the politics of their representative status).
94
A good illustration of this point is the controversy within the United States over the
content of the draft platform for the Women's Conference in Beijing. Some hailed the
conference and the platform as an unambiguous advance for women globally, while
others criticized it as promoting a radical feminist agenda and disregarding the interests
of women in developing countries. Compare Geraldine A. Ferraro, Women's Rights,
Human Rights, N.Y. TIsS, Aug. 22, 1995, at A15 (emphasizing the significance of the
conference for women globally and urging the U.S. delegation not to boycott) with
Camille Paglia, A White Liberal Women's Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A25
(accusing Western feminist ideology of at times "rid[ing] roughshod over the concerns
of 95delegates from the third world").
See Bunting, supra note 58.
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lenged, and renegotiated by individuals living within inevitably overlapping cultural communities.
This oversimplification of culture may lead relativists to accept too
readily a cultural defense articulated by state actors or other elites on
the international level, actors that tend not to be women. 96 Yet, it seems
unlikely that a cultural defense offered by the state will adequately
reflect the dynamic, evolving, and possibly conflicting cultural concerns
of its citizens. Given the complexity and multiplicity of culture, the
ability or inclination of heads of state to identify and translate cultural
practices into specific defenses against the imposition of Western human
rights norms is questionable. Feminists in particular have cited example
after example in which culture has been selectively
and perhaps cyni97
cally invoked to justify oppressive practices.
The apparent inconsistency between cultural relativists' fear of intercultural coercion and virtual neglect of intra-cultural coercion must be
understood in light of relativists' assumptions about the relationship
between culture and the individual. If culture is understood simply as a
reflection of human will, then the existence of any particular social
organization tends to become its own legitimation. Focused on defending
cultural integrity from external encroachment, cultural relativists tend to
be much less concerned with the way culture determines or limits the
individual's possibilities for self-definition.
2. Feminist Anti-Essentialism: Complicating Coercion
Although cultural relativists and universalist defenders of the existing
human rights regime are fundamentally opposed in their approaches,
they find common ground to the extent that the existing regime embraces
values of self-determination, both cultural and political. Yet, it is precisely this privileging of autonomy that triggers feminism's departure
from both liberal pluralism and cultural relativism. The version of cultural relativism that is informed by liberalism's concern for autonomy
and self-determination treats cross-cultural critique as an encroachment
on cultural integrity.98 To the extent that cultural relativists are concerned
with coercion or cultural imperialism, they tend to associate an absence
96

For an excellent example of such a claim, see Rao, supra note 92, at 170. Rao cites

Kenyatta's invocation of culture as a defense to the practice of female genital surgery

among Kikuyu. Rao urges the questioning of the "politics of such a claim, particularly
when it is made by a male national leader on behalf of the social group most directly
affected by the practice: women'" Id.
97Ann Elizabeth Mayer offers the example of the government of Egypt dissolving the

Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA) for political reasons but offering the
post-hoc justification that AWSA had offended Islam. Mayer, supra note 91, at 180-81.
98 A weaker version of cultural relativism concerned with problems of.epistemology
might treat cross-cultural critique as incoherent, except within the culture offering the
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of cross-cultural critique with human freedom; thus, they confine moral
judgments about intra-cultural coercion to the only standards that they
deem coherent: local standards. 99 This argument privileging social autonomy creates an unlikely alliance between cultural relativists and liberal
universalists, particularly with respect to issues emerging from the private as opposed to the public sphere. 00
In contrast to cultural relativists and liberal pluralists, 1°0 feminist antiessentialists are centrally concerned with the interplay between culture
and self, exploring ways in which culture constructs gendered individuals. Unlike the cultural relativist model, which privileges the action of
the individual or group in the creation of culture, much of feminist
theory assumes a more complicated connection between culture and
limits on human subjectivity. 10 2 Unlike the liberal pluralist view, which
focuses on state power and privileges private ordering, feminism emphasizes the role of private power. The most important premise of this
feminist view is that the sex/gender system is substantially a product of
03
culture rather than divine will, human biology or natural selection.
Implicit in this assumption is the claim that cultural norms-language,
law, myth, custom-are not merely products of human will and action
but also define and limit the possibilities for human identity.
Connected with this view of cultural limitations on human subjectivity
is the notion that cultural norms function as a source of power and
control within modem society. 10 4 Consistent with this recognition, many
critique, although not necessarily imperialist. Such a view would emphasize the futility
rather than the illegitimacy of appeals to universalist standards.
99
1t is important, of course, to keep in mind the possibility of intra-cultural critique
and rebellion. Anthropologists and other defenders of cultural relativism who have tended

to idealize non-Western cultures have had to confront the abuses by post-colonial regimes
in Cambodia, Uganda, and Ethiopia, and the emigration of many citizens of those states
to formerly colonial states in the West.
10
Bronwyn Winter illustrates the potential for coincidence of relativist and liberal
arguments regarding the private sphere in her discussion of female genital surgery. See
Winter, supra note 86, at 951-54.
1011 use the term "liberalism" or "liberal pluralism" to refer to a commitment to the
basic political framework that underlies existing human rights standards. "Universalism"
refers to a commitment to universally applicable human rights norms, though not
necessarily
to those currently embodied in international law.
1°2 Although generalizing, I would argue that most feminists, whether or not they define
themselves as anti-essentialists, posit an important role for culture in constraining
women's subjectivity. It is this constraint in its many forms, and the belief that it is
malleable, that animates much of feminist politics.
103Feminist theorists sometimes express this relationship between subjectivity and
culture as the distinction between sex and gender, a distinction perhaps first emphasized
by Simone de Beauvoir in her claim, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman."
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A.

Knopf, Inc. 1953) (1949).
l04Michel Foucault offered perhaps the most fully elaborated account of the exercise
of power through systems of cultural regulations. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, Right of
Death and Power Over Life, in THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 135 (Robert Hurley trans.,
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feminists have rejected a theory of power that posits monolithic control
held by a coherent or unified sovereign. 10 5 Yet, it is precisely this model
of power that traditional human rights standards are designed to regulate
and to which cultural relativists often defer when exercised within cultural boundaries. In contrast, feminists, influenced by Foucault, have
emphasized the degree to which power is exercised both from above, by
sovereigns, and within concrete social interactions and relationships-in
short, through culture. 10 6 For feminists, culture itself becomes a source
of control and a site of resistance, a form of power that-feminist human
rights activists must7 engage directly along with more traditional public
10
and private forms.
Feminist anti-essentialists' emphasis on culture's role in creating and
regulating human beings helps to explain their departure from both
liberal pluralism and cultural relativism. Although feminism, liberal pluralism, and some forms of cultural relativism share a concern over
coercion, for feminists, simply preserving self-determination either on
the individual or cultural level is an inadequate response. A focus on
external coercion privileges a traditional model of power exercised by
elites and treats local manifestations of that power, such as family relationships, as by-products of individual ordering. Yet, if the self is constituted by culture, as many feminists assume, equating emancipation
from external coercion with individual freedom is problematic. Instead,
feminists must consider a more complex process of emancipation that
involves transformation of the self.

1978) (discussing the regulatory function of definitions of normal and deviant sexuality).
Feminists have elaborated on Foucault's ideas, taking into account the gendered aspects
of such regulation, an aspect that Foucault himself largely ignored. See, e.g., FEMINISM
AND FOUCAULT: REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds., 1988)

(collection of essays assessing the relevance of Foucaultian analysis for feminism); JANA
SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER AND THE BODY (1991); SANDRA
L. BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF

OPPRESSION (1990).
05
1 See Biddy Martin, Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault, in FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT:
REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE, supra note 104, at 3, 6.
106 See, e.g., Jana Sawicki, Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault and Feminism, in FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT: REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE, supra note 104, at
177 (emphasizing the importance of understanding the multiple sites of oppression).
107 Acknowledging the importance of non-traditional sources of power, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women obliges states to "take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise." Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 195,
U.N. Doc. A/180 (1979).
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IV. CULTURE AS A LENS ON GENDER
Feminism's general unwillingness to equate individual autonomy or
cultural self-determination with noncoercion complicates rather than simplifies the problem of inter-cultural critique. Having rejected the imposition of an externally derived normative vision of the good, both liberal
pluralism and cultural relativism rely in different ways on self-determination as a normative standard by which the exercise of power may be
judged. Although feminism shares with relativism and liberal pluralism
a concern with the risks of coercion and ultimately with self-determination, feminist theory's focus on the role of culture in limiting the self
precludes an unproblematic reliance on internal norms. Just as cultural
relativism calls into question the coherence of an external, universalist
critique of cultural practices, feminist anti-essentialism also emphasizes
the limits of a critique internal to the culture or even to the individual.
This section explores the specific problems these conflicting commitments create for the feminist human rights activist and suggests some
possibilities for inter-cultural human rights analysis given these limitations.

A. Social Construction and the Problem of Agency
The notion that women may be oppressed in part through the internalization of cultural norms calls into question the reliance on individual
accounts of oppression. At the same time, Western feminist human rights
activism takes as its central principle the notion that women's power to
control their own lives must be enhanced. If culture constructs women's
experiences of their own flourishing, how should feminists outside the
culture interpret those experiences? Should internal accounts be privileged as expressing an alternative, culturally situated vision of the good
or discounted as a product of patriarchy? Assuming that culture is invoked at the local level by women who, in Western feminists' view, are
oppressed by a particular practice, feminism requires a critique that
respects the agency of the oppressed without ignoring the oppression.
Satisfied with neither cultural relativism nor universalism, feminists
committed to cross-cultural political action must consider whether it is
possible to distinguish between false consciousness, which should be
exposed, and genuine cultural differences in conceptions of women's
flourishing, which should be respected. One way to do so would be to
return to a form of essentialism, favoring a presumption, perhaps qualified,
of commonality among women. A core of shared characteristics or experiences could serve as a yardstick, albeit an imperfect one, against
which oppression might be measured. Feminists could treat the relative
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progress of women in the West as a standard, creating critical purchase
against which the more severe problems of women in developing countries might be analyzed.
Pursuing this course, Susan Moller Okin has argued that feminist
anti-essentialists mistakenly assume that differences among women necessarily overwhelm commonalities.10 8 She insists that it is not necessarily
inappropriate to translate to other cultures theories of women's oppression developed in the West. On the contrary, Western feminist theories
have much to say about the conditions of women elsewhere.10 9 Rejecting
the anti-essentialist multiplication of difference, she suggests that the
condition of poor women in developing countries can often be understood as "similar to ours but more so?' n °0 Supporting Western feminists'
liberal notion of women's emancipation, Okn argues that "we are not
always enlightened about what is just by asking persons who seem to
be suffering injustices what they want. Oppressed people have often
internalized their oppression so well that they have no sense of what
they are justly entitled to as human beings?""' Apparently coming down
squarely on the side of Western feminists' authority, or even obligation,
to define norms of women's flourishing, Okin ascribes to false consciousness any potential disagreement arising from cultural defenses
112
offered by women themselves.
On the one hand, Okin's approach seems inconsistent with feminism's
basic commitment to the enfranchisement of the powerless, the importance of attending to the experiences of the oppressed. Feminism is
premised in part on the notion that women have something to say, that
05
See Susan M. Okin, supra note 36. Okin concedes that the anti-essentialist critique
is valid as applied to much early feminist work, id. at 6, but argues that feminists should
not simply assume that cross-cultural explanations of gender inequality are impossible.
9
10
See id. at 9-18 (comparing Western and non-Western women's experience in four
areas: inattention to gender injustice, gender-based lack of equality of opportunity,
injustice in the family, and policy implications of such inequality).
"1d.at 8. Okin goes on to suggest that feminists should work from this presumption
and that "the burden of proof is on the critic" to demonstrate the priority of difference
over sameness.

"'Id.
at 19.
112She explains that "[doming to terms with very little is no recipe for social justice
.... [C]ommitted outsiders can often be better analysts and critics of social injustice
than those who live within the relevant culture" Id. at 19.
Hilary Putnam has made a related point regarding access to information necessary to
such assessments:
The fact that someone feels satisfied with a situation means little if the person has
no information or false information concerning either her own capacities or the
existence of available alternatives to her present way of life. The real test is not
what women who have never heard of feminism say about their situation ....
Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1671,
1676 (1990).
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women are entitled to describe and define their own experience."t 3 Indeed, the emphasis of some theorists on so-called "standpoint epistemology" assigns particular significance to the voices and experiences of the
oppressed." 4 Across disciplines, feminists have grounded their methodologies in a special respect for women's voices speaking from their
marginalized perspectives.' 5 Careful and specific attention to those perspectives has yielded new insights in a wide range of areas, from phi-16
losophy to literary criticism to adolescent psychology to legal theory)"
By emphasizing limitations on the consciousness of the oppressed, Okin
downplays the liberatory and creative potential7 of allowing marginalized
perspectives to redefine women's condition."
Nevertheless, despite the emphasis of standpoint epistemologists on
the importance of women's stories as understood by women themselves,
the problem of untangling the connection between the oppression of
women and their own definition of their condition persists. Should feminists simply accept all women's descriptions of their experiences and
defenses of their cultures in the name of agency? This position, too, is
113
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 40, at 55 (describing this focus on women's experiences
as the "common theme" among all types of feminist theory); Christine A. Littleton,
Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of
Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 24 (discussing the significance and limits of women's
perspectives
on their own oppression).
l 4 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763 (1990); Mai J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RE1'. 7 (1989).
This approach works most effectively when the target is the oppressor group and the
lines are clearly drawn. It works less well when the disagreement focuses on the nature
of oppression and one is called upon to assess the deference due the perspective of the
oppressed. See Scott Brewer, Pragmatism, Oppression, and the Flight to Substance, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1753 (1990) (discussing the tension between the procedural standard of
deference to the point of view of the oppressed and substantive norms against which to
measure the validity of that perspective).
1 See, e.g., Bartlett, supranote 63, at 837-49 (discussing the value of consciousnessraising as feminist legal method and the importance of "asking the woman question");
D. Kay Johnston, Adolescents' Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables: Two Moral Orientations-Two Problem Solving Strategies, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 49, 50-60
(Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988) (describing methodology used for analyzing gender-differentiated responses to moral questions and arguing for the relevance of gender-differentiation to theories of moral development); MICHELLE FINE, DISRUPTIVE VOICES: THE
POSSIBILITIES OF FEMINIST RESEARCH (1992) (surveying range of feminist research

methods
designed to incorporate women's voices).
6
" See supra text accompanying notes 61-64 (discussing contributions of anti-essentialist thinking to feminist theory).
"17Another problem with Okin's analysis is that, by privileging relatively less-oppressed voices of Western women, Okin tends to ascribe complete agency to those
women while explaining the perspectives of non-Western women as false consciousness.
As Jane Flax points out in her response to Okin's essay, this logic ignores the degree to
which non-Western women have themselves generated a vibrant critique from within the
culture and the possibilities of false consciousness among Western women. See Jane
Flax, Race/Gender and the Ethics of Difference: A Reply to Okin's "Gender Inequality
and Cultural Differences", 23 POL. THEORY 500, 503 (1995).
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inconsistent with a basic assumption of feminist practice and theory: the
possibility of internalized oppression and the role of consciousness-raising through self-examination and sharing of experiences."' The concept
of internalized oppression and the process of consciousness-raising both
imply that every woman's report of her own condition may not be fully
credited as a reliable guide to her own flourishing.
How can feminists reconcile the possibility of internalized oppression,
or false consciousness, with the anti-essentialist rejection of any core of
womanhood, or true consciousness? The first step must be to uncouple
these two concepts, to recognize that false consciousness does not necessarily imply the availability of true consciousness.' 1 9 False consciousness should be measured not against true consciousness (objective, absolute, pre-political) but against feminist consciousness (subjective,
contested, political). Feminist consciousness, in turn, must be understood
as consisting of multiple and sometimes competing critical stances toward cultural oppression. These critical stances emerge from the political activity and theorizing of women whose experiences are both par120
tially determined by oppression and partially independent of it.
Starting with the assumption that women are both free and unfree, and
that the parameters of freedom are contested, reminds Western feminists
of the partiality of their own perspectives and the possibility of their
l18 For a discussion of the role of consciousness-raising in feminist method, see
MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 83-105; Bartlett, supra note 63, at 863.
1 9 Catharine MacKinnon has stated the problem in the following way:
Not all women agree with the feminist account of women's situation, nor do all
feminists agree with any single rendition of feminism. Authority of interpretation-here, the claim to speak for all women-is always fraught because authority
is the issue male method intended to settle ....

Treating some women's views

as merely wrong, because they are unconscious conditioned reflections of oppression and thus complicitous in it, posits objective ground .... Both feminism and
antifeminism respond to the condition of women, so feminism is not exempt from
devalidation on the same account.
MacKinnon, supra note 55, at 115.
120 Christine Littleton observes that "[r]ather than viewing any woman's description
as, on the one hand, potentially inaccurate, socially conditioned or merely the product
of internalized oppression; or, on the other, individualized, attributable solely to determinants other than gender, or exceptional," feminists should assume that "women's
descriptions of our experience are accurate, reasonable and potentially understandable
given the conditions under which we live." Littleton, supra note 113, at 27 (emphasis
omitted).
Within U.S. feminism, the problem of agency and coercion has emerged most visibly
in the context of debates over women's sexuality and the possibility of pleasure under
patriarchy. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995) (arguing for a theory of partial agency); cf. Joan
Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1559 (1991); James Boyle; Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. Rav. 489 (1991).
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own internalized oppression. Recognizing both the constraints of culture
and the possibility of increased freedom, feminists must examine the
complicated and sometimes conflicting cultural texts of their own lives
and those of other women. Simplistic assumptions about universality or
cultural particularity are inadequate. Instead, differences must be explored critically with the goal of better understanding the multiple ways
in which gender hierarchy may be embedded in culture.
IIt is critical at this juncture to examine more closely the relationship
between the claim that all knowledge is culturally contingent and the
claim that an individual's understanding of self and identity can be
deemed incomplete. These claims seem at some level contradictory: if
knowledge, including self-understanding, is culturally relative, in what
sense can that knowledge be incomplete? Yet, the first claim calls into
question the coherence of cross-cultural evaluation only to the extent
that we seek a meta-explanation of moral conflict, one that transcends
human experience. This argument does not engage the issue at the level
of the individual psyche.12 ' To say that we cannot judge definitively
among competing cultural norms is not to say that we cannot communicate across cultural divides. Thus, when feminists acknowledge both
the contingency of knowledge on cultural location and the possibility of
transforming consciousness, they are not making inconsistent claims.
Rather, they are making two different types of arguments-one epistemological, the other psychological.
Understood in this way, cross-cultural feminist activism is fully consistent with the acknowledgment of the cultural contingency of women's
experience and varying accounts of gender. Consciousness-raising is
redefined as a process of transforming the consciousness of all the
participants, not simply of exposing one falsely conscious to the truth
of women's oppression. Moreover, if one understands culture as defining
the limits of human subjectivity and shaping consciousness, cross-cultural
communication, while difficult, becomes an important tool in revealing
alternative manifestations of gender difference and its cultural meaning.
Thus, in contrast to cultural relativists, who view cultural difference as
an occasion for silence, feminists may view it as an opportunity to
explore the many ways culture inscribes gender hierarchy. 122 Difference
makes the conversation interesting, not impossible.
121Anthony Appiah makes a similar argument when he suggests that we reconcile the
tension between structure and agency by distinguishing between logical arguments and
psychological ones. The logic of structure and the experience of agency address different
aspects of human experience and compete on different levels "not for causal space but
for narrative space." Anthony Appiah, Tolerable Falsehoods:Agency and the Interests of
Theory, in CONSEQUENCES OF THEORY 63, 74 (Jonathan Arac & Barbara Johnson eds.,
1991).
122 Discussing divisions among Western feminists, Jana Sawicki suggests:
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B. The Risks and Rewards of Cross-Cultural Feminism
By recognizing internalized oppression as a manifestation of the exercise of power, feminism avoids the mistake, shared by cultural relativists and liberal pluralists, of defining relationships, personal desires,
and conceptions of the self as outside the realm of the political. By
politicizing the personal and the cultural, feminist anti-essentialism calls
into question even individuals' description of their own condition. Oddly
egalitarian, such an approach destabilizes the position of Western feminists. It yields only contested norms and conflicting understandings, all
of which can be described as products of patriarchy. Nevertheless, global
feminism should not be understood simply as a large, multifaceted conversation about difference that will lead ineluctably to a greater recognition of commonalities. Such an approach personalizes the political by
articulating claims in terms of universal womanhood rather than feminism and downplays differences as obstacles to be overcome in the
movement toward universalism. Moreover, the metaphor of a conversation obscures the degree to which global feminism entails the exercise
of power.
As the Beijing Conference illustrates, positing widespread commonality among women as a descriptive matter is simply inaccurate. However,
if feminists begin from an acknowledgment that their description of
women's condition is not only culturally contingent but political, defending the accuracy of the description is less important than assessing the
consequences of its inaccuracy. The development of feminist political
strategies may stress shared problems or particular local manifestations
of oppression without suggesting that either characterization fully captures women's experience. Once feminists acknowledge the politics of
global feminism, the choice to focus on either difference or commonality
can itself be made contextually by assessing the risks each strategy
entails.
1. Risks of Assuming Commonality
Cross-cultural feminist analysis based on an assumption of commonality presents the risk that, by generalizing across a range of women,
feminist theory that is derived from within any particular culture will
oversimplify the experience of women in other cultures. This problem
is presented when women with unequal power and resources make consistent claims based on very different experiences. In such a context, the
presumption of commonality may mask significant differences in women's
experiences that are relevant to strategies for reform, even when women's
ultimate goals are not in conflict.

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

Surface similarities, buttressed by a presumption of commonality, may
lead to a misdiagnosis of the causes of women's oppression and to
ill-conceived policy solutions. For example, like their Western sisters,
women in developing countries tend to face discrimination within, or
even exclusion from, the labor market, to work a double shift when they
are employed, and to have their family labor discounted as nonproductive. 123 Nevertheless, the specific economic and political implications of
these problems depend upon the degree to which the economy is industrialized and the ways in which the family is organized.1 24 Calls for
desegregating the workplace or allowing women expanded access to
wage work may complicate gender oppression through capitalist
exploi125
tation in ways that Western feminists have not anticipated.
Improving process, expanding communication, and making the politics of the feminist movement more inclusive may address the risk of
oversimplification to some degree. However, the complexity of this task
ought not to be underestimated. A process of collaboration premised on
any hope of effective communication must address not only problems of
language and literacy, but an historical legacy of unequal power, exploitation, and distrust. Western feminist activists must simply accept and
work within this historical context without succumbing to a desire either
to ignore persistent power imbalances
or to deny their own complicity
126
in this history of oppression.
Difference can be a resource insofar as it enables us to multiply the sources of
resistance to the myriad of relations of domination that circulate through the social
field. If there is no central locus of power, then neither is there a central locus of
resistance. Moreover, if we redefine our differences, discover new ways of
understanding ourselves and each other, then our differences are less likely to be
used against us.
Sawicki, supra note 104, at 187.
123 See generally PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITUTION (1993); VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988);
MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEw FEMINIST ECONOMICS 15-30 (1988)
(discussing the exclusion of women's labor from international measures of productivity).
124 For a specific example of the importance of local factors in reform efforts, see Faye
V. Harrison, Women in Jamaica's Urban Informal Economy: Insights from a Kingston
Slum, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 173 (Chandra T.
Mohanty et al. eds., 1991).
125For example, The New York Times recently reported the prevalence of kidnapping
and domestic slavery in China. Women go to public marketplaces to sell their labor with
the hope of escaping rural poverty, but are then kidnapped by slave-traders. Market wages
attract these women from the relative safety of their villages to the domain of commerce
where they are not adequately protected from exploitation. See Seth Faison, Women as
Chattel: In China, Slavery Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at Al.
This is not to say that Western women should judge for women in developing countries
which choices they should make (rural poverty versus the risks of violence and
exploitation) but rather to suggest that Western solutions such as expanded market
opportunities for women must take into account the complexity of women's oppression
in other cultural settings.
126Responding to the critique of feminists of color, a number of white feminists have
begun to work specifically on the issue of racism and white women, arguing for
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A second, arguably more complex, set of problems emerges when,
despite communication and participation, irreconcilable differences persist in women's descriptions of oppression. What happens when women
actually communicate and identify differences that genuinely divide them
according to their own reports of their experience and their own visions
of human flourishing? This problem arises within U.S. feminism, particularly in connection with theories of women's sexuality, where debate
rages among feminists, 127 and abortion rights, where disagreement persists among women, although less so among feminists. 128 The possibility
for division looms even larger on the international level.
Here feminists face directly the prospect of cross-cultural coercionsome women exercising power over others to enforce their own vision
of women's emancipation. It is here that feminists find essentialism the
most tempting. Assuming a common "essence' among women, whatever
its origin, allows feminists to move in one of two directions. First,
problems that are properly of the second type-that is, concrete differences in women's definition of their own flourishing-can be reassigned
to the first category. Any disagreement can be treated as a failure of
communication, a failure of the cross-cultural feminist process. Yet,
despite the inevitable difficulties of international feminist politics arising
from culture, language, and perhaps most importantly, power differences, it is a mistake to assign all disagreement among women about the
nature and scope of their oppression to inadequate process. Often coming in the form of a call for more education by Western feminists of
women of developing countries, such an assumption is not only arrogant
but sets up a false hope of consensus through communication. By positing the possibility, or even inevitability, of consensus, essentialism
undermines political action based on partial alliances among women.
Paradoxically, the second direction in which essentialism leads feminist politics is away from process and toward universalism. The essentialist assumption that all women's oppression shares a common core or

integrating an analysis of race and gender. See, e.g., Ann Russo, "We Cannot Live
Without Our Lives": White Women, Antiracism, and Feminism, in THID WORLD WOMEN
AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM, supra note 124, at 297; RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE
WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); ZILLAH R.
EISENSTEIN, THE COLOR OF GENDER: REIMAGINING DEMOCRACY (1994).
127 Compare PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance
ed., 2d ed. 1992) (essays discussing the possibility of affirmative or agentic female
sexuality) and POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (Ann Snitow et al. eds.,
1983) (same) with MACKINNON, supra note 55 (articulating a theory of women's
sexuality as a product of male dominance). For a discussion of the continued relevance
of this debate, see Abrams, supra note 120.
128For a discussion of the significance of this divide to feminist political claims, see
Tracy E. Higgins, By Reason of Their Sex: Feminism, Postmodernism, and Justice, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 101 (1995). See also Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and
Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST
NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS (Susan 0. Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994).
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that women's experience may be represented generally across cultures
may lead to the conclusion that the process of inter-cultural coalitionbuilding is merely strategic rather than substantive. So viewed, feminist
cross-cultural communication, with all of its complexity, is justified only
so long as it is necessary to widen the scope of a feminist vision of
human rights. Viewed as a means rather than an end, it becomes subject
to a utilitarian calculus. When force rather than consensus is a better
tool, force may be used unproblematically.
2. Risks of Assuming Difference
Beginning with the assumption that cultural difference is primary,
feminist anti-essentialists address some of the problems of misdescription and coercion by giving priority to cultural, racial, ethnic, economic,
and religious differences among women. Radical anti-essentialism demands that feminists pay attention to the particularities of women's
condition, especially those women who are relatively less powerful, by
constantly questioning the validity of cross-cultural assumptions. At the
same time, this emphasis on difference also entails risks that must be
weighed against the benefits of anti-essentialist theorizing.
First, presuming that moral standards are necessarily local, and therefore that just solutions must be derived locally, dismisses the possibility
that cross-cultural oppression in fact exists. Patriarchy is not a local
phenomenon, although its particular manifestations may vary substantially from culture to culture. 29 If women's oppression is global, feminists should not surrender the task of thinking about its cross-cultural
causes and explanations, even while realizing that any such theory will
be imperfect or perhaps even highly problematic. 130 The task is not to
settle on a fully elaborated theory that will perfectly describe women's
condition, but rather to find partial, contingent theories that will usefully
31
describe the condition of women for some cross-cultural purposes.1
Second, emphasizing differences rather than commonalities threatens
to divide political alliances among women. Arguably, coalitions of women
are simply better off focusing on what they share and formulating common descriptions of their problems, even while recognizing that those
descriptions may be incomplete. This may be true even though the
129 See Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 67, at 23-25 (criticizing Lyotard's "justice of
multiplicities"
as obscuring the possibilities of global systems of oppression).
U3°See Rooney, supra note 50, at 153 (discussing the necessity of taking the "risk of
essentialism" or the "strategicuse of a positivist essentialism" in an effort to further the
political interests of women as a group). For further discussion of the usefulness of
essentialism,
see the essays collected in THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 50.
13 1 See Appiah, supra note 121, at 77 (arguing that "our theories are best conceived of
as idealizations, and that this means that they are both (in some sense) approximately
true and conditional upon false assumptions that simplify the theoretical task").
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consequences of that incompleteness almost certainly will fall disproportionately on relatively less powerful women. Rather than choosing between a full account of women's difference on the one hand and a
perfect description of women's sameness on the other, feminists must
simply recognize that neither option is fully realizable. Instead, feminist
theorists, advocates, and policymakers must strive for an account that
will best address problems shared by13many
women, thereby serving as
2
a basis for concerted political action.
Third, highlighting difference rather than sameness may encourage
provincialism and justify isolationism among feminists. If feminists proceed under the assumption that women's experiences in one cultural
location have no, or perhaps only limited, relevance for women in another, they will be tempted to mind their own problems. If one adds to
that assumption the concern that cross-cultural advocacy or intervention
is coercive or imperialist, feminists may be reluctant to intervene in
support of women globally, despite the potential for progress in ending
women's oppression. Attention to culture and respect for difference may
be taken as a justification for inaction, especially in light of the inevitable complexity of any cross-cultural endeavor.

CONCLUSION
Confronted with the challenge of cultural relativism, feminism faces
divergent paths,1 33 neither of which seems to lead out of the woods of
patriarchy. The first path, leading to simple tolerance of cultural difference, is too broad. To follow it would require feminists to ignore pervasive limits on women's freedom in the name of an autonomy that exists
for women in theory only. The other path, leading to objective condemnation of cultural practices, is too narrow. To follow it would require
132This being said, it is also important to heed the anti-essentialist warning that any
such attempt to construct a cross-cultural theory, to posit sameness, will inevitably
generate division. See Butler, supra note 62. This is a risk that must be a part of the
calculus.
133The problem of imperfect perception is illustrated by Hilary Putnam in his quotation
of William James's The Will to Believe:
We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist,
through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive.
If we stand still, we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road, we shall
be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one.
This metaphor illustrates both the incompleteness of perception and the necessity of
action. Putnam, supra note 112, at 1693-94 (quoting William James, The Will to Believe,
in THm WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 33 (1975)
(quoting J. FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 353 (1874)).
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feminists to dismiss the culturally distinct experiences of women as false
consciousness. Yet to forge an alternative path is difficult, requiring
feminists to confront the risks inherent in global strategies for change.
Building upon women's shared experiences inevitably entails a risk of
misdescription, or worse, cooptation but contains the promise of transforming and radicalizing women's understanding of their own condition.
Emphasizing difference threatens to splinter women politically, undermining hard-won progress, but may simultaneously uncover new possibilities for re-creating gender relations. Forging a combined strategy that
respects both commonality and difference requires feminists to acknowledge that we cannot eliminate the risk of coercion altogether, but the
risk of inaction is also ever present.

